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TREATY OR NO TREATY
Focus
On August 6, 1985, eight leaders of the South Pacific Forum
(SPF) formally signed the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty
(SPNFZ). Those who signed were Australia, Cook Islands, Kiribati,
Fiji, New Zealand, Tuvalu, Western Samoa and Niue. Fiji and the
Cook Islands deposited their instrument of ratification at
the same occasion. Of the five countries that did not sign only
Vanuatu said that it would not sign the Treaty at all. Papua
New Guinea (who later in the year signed), indicated that
due to constitutional requirements, it could not do so at the
time. Nauru, Tonga and Solomon Islands were also of the same view.
The Treaty requires that eight members ratify it for it to become
registered with the United Nations.
The Treaty which contains sixteen articles, three protocols
and four annexes, commits signatories to prohibit the storing,
testing and dumping of nuclear wastes in the parties land and
ocean jurisdiction. The Treaty further requires the signatories
to renounce nuclear warfare and forbids assisting such warfare.
But members can decide independently whether to allow foreign
nuclear ships and warplanes to use their harbours and airports.
Statement of problem
Since 1985 however, the Treaty has been marred by dissension
amongst the signatories themselves and a growing skepticism has
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arisen from proponents and opponents alike about its worth. At
the 1985 SPF just before the eve of its signing, Vanuatu's Prime
Minister Fr. Walter Lini rejected the draft proposal of the
Treaty saying that it was not "comprehensive enough". Lini was
later to expand on his opposition by charging that nothing in the
Treaty would stop American and Soviet vessels from steaming
through the zone (1). He inferred that it was not what Pacific
islanders wanted. The Solomon Islands who had expressed
endorsement of the Treaty at the Rarotonga Forum later in
1986 called the Treaty "useless", indicating that it would not
agree to anything short of a total ban on nuclear arms in the
Pacific region (2). The Cook Islands who had ratified the Treaty
in 1985 took a complete turnabout in 1986. At a meeting in May,
the Prime Minister of the Cook Islands Sir Thomas Davis
threatened to severe his tiny nation's ties with the Treaty
should it restrict American access to the region (3). The
Government of Papua New Guinea has also indicated its unhappiness
with the Treaty suggesting that it may review its stance.
This growing skepticism about the SPNFZ Treaty (often called
the Treaty of Rarotonga), has heightened tensions in the region,
and one which will prove the solidarity of the SPF. As David
Robie notes when pointing out a likely rift in the SPF, "it could
become another source of irritation between Melanesian nations
and Polynesian countries" at the 1986 SPF in Suva, Fiji (4). He
further speculates that it could see corrosion of the traditional
Pacific Way of reaching agreement by concensus.
The objective of this paper is essentially fourfold: (a) to
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review the SPNFZ Treaty; (b) to identify key factors in the
Treaty that appears to have retarded common agreement amongst the
Treaty partners; (c) to carry out a comparative study of the
SPNFZ Treaty with the only other treaty in existence relating to
general arms control efforts, namely the 1967 Treaty of
Tlatelolco proscribing nuclear weapons in Latin America; and (d)
to examine Vanuatu's opposition to the Treaty.
Before delving into these however, a look into the
historical background of the SPNFZ Treaty might be warranted in
order to allow the reader to follow and consequently formulate
his or her own opinion on the subject.
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Chapter II
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE NUCLEAR FREE ZONE CONCEPT
IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC
A regional concern.
Since the atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki ended the
Pacific war, the region has been used to develop and test nuclear
weapons. The U.S. began testing in 1946 at Bikini Atoll in the
Harshall Islands and it exploded its first hydrogen bomb on
Enewetak Atoll in 1952 (5). Over the next six years, some 66 test
were carried out at Bikini and Enewetak (6). From there the U.S.
moved its tests to Johnston Island near Hawaii. Britain also
conducted an extensive program of atmospheric test in the
Pacific. It exploded some twelve atom bombs on Australian
territory and then moved its tests to Christmas Island where it
exploded its first thermonuclear device in 1957. As a consequence
of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the U.S. and Britain ceased
testing in the Pacific in 1963. France remains the only state
which continues its nuclear tests in the region. It established
a test site on Moruroa Atoll in French Polynesia in 1963 and
detonated its first atmospheric explosion there in 1966 (7).
Over the subsequent nine years, some 41 nuclear devices were
exploded in the atmosphere at Horuroa Atoll. In all, it has been
estimated that the U.S., Britain and France have exploded 213
nuclear devices in the atmosphere of the Pacific (8).
Regional opposition to nuclear testing began in the early
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1970s, specifically against continued French testing at Horuroa.
The Labour Governments of Australia and New Zealand together with
the Government of Fiji took the issue to the International Court
of Justice and a boycott was placed in Australia and New Zealand
on links with France. In the face of growing opposition, French
atmospheric testing ceased and in 1975 the French took its tests
underground in Horuroa.
It is not only in the area of nuclear testing that Pacific
states have opposed. The dumping of radio-active waste and
missile testing have also been of concern, particularly in the
late 1970s and 1980s. When a panel of four Japanese scientists
met with Pacific leaders in 1980 in Guam to explain that
country's proposal to dump nuclear waste in the North-Western
Pacific Ocean, leaders told them that they wanted no part of any
dumping (9). Whilst there are no current programs for dumping
radio-active waste in the Pacific, U.S. and Japanese studies have
explored the possibility (10). Such suggestions have been strongly
opposed by South Pacific states and in deference to their views,
Japan has given some assurances that its disposal programs will
take regional opinion into account (11).
Three nuclear powers- the U.S., China and the Soviet Union
use the Pacific for missile testing. The Soviet Union and China
have used international waters within the region for splash down
points in their missile testing programs. The U.S. however makes
the most extensive use of the Pacific for missile testing. It
maintains permanent testing facilities on Kwajalein Atoll in the




trajectories and impact accuracies and can launch ABM's for test
purposes (13).
As mentioned earlier regional opposition to nuclear
activities (specifically testing) had aroused vocal condemnation
in the early 1970s. Leaders of South Pacific states have taken
every opportunity in international meetings to voice their concerns.
The SPF began condemning testing in 1973 at their meeting in
Suva. There have also been public outcries over the issue.
These have come through organised citizen movements such as the
Nuclear Free Pacific Movement, the Against Testing on Horuroa
(ATOM) group and the Pacific Concerns Resource Centre.
Organizations in the region such as the Pacific Islands Conference
of Churches, the Pacific Trade Union Congress and some seventy
other organization in the region. Trade unions in the region
have been especially radical in it's stance. It has gone as far
as refusing the loading and unloading of French merchant shipping
in South Pacific ports at every opportunity.
While much of the regions protests over the nuclear issue
has met with some success (in so far as forcing France to conduct
it tests underground and postponing radio-active waste proposals),
the feeling is that it is still short of what the countries in
the region had wanted. The French Government's reluctance to
cease all testing only angered Pacific leaders. This frustration
drove them to find other measures, one of them being a
declaration of a Nuclear Free Zone (NFZ).
The next section thus examines some of the proposals
was pursued. Two of them - the New Zealand initiative of
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and the Australian proposal of 1983 are of special importance
here: The New Zealand proposal whilst not succeeding in having a
Treaty, nevertheless did provide the impetus for a NFZ concept in
the region. The Australian proposal which learnt some lesson
from the defunct New Zealand initiative led ultimately to the
1985 SPNFZ Treaty.
Even before we look into these initiatives however, it is
perhaps useful to clarify two points. These relate to the
concept of a NFZ itself and the interchangeable usage of the term
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ).
NWFZ as a term is widely established in United Nations and
other international usage, for example in Latin American and
Antarctica Treaties. The drafters of the SPNFZ Treaty decided to
delete the term weapon in their Treaty for in their view it would
contradict the other issues addressed in the Treaty, notably the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy and especially the dumping of
nuclear waste. It seemed to them that it would be more appropriate
therefore not to use the term weapon in the title.
The concept of NFZ is a fairly new one. Ramesh Thakur
in examining the concept notes that it "arose from the desire of
non-nuclear countries to disengage, on their own terms from the
nuclear madness of the major powers. It denotes a zone which a
group of states may establish by a treaty whereby the status of
total absence of nuclear weapons to which the zone shall be
subject is defined and a system of verification and control is
set up to guarantee compliance" (14). He continues that the "three
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essential characteristics of such a zone are non possession, non
deployment and non-use of nuclear weapons" (15). Its goal is to
"isolate a resion from an outbreak of nuclear war. Subsumed
within this broad objective are subsidiary goals of reducing the
probability of war, decreasing the harmful effects if war should
nevertheless occur, and lowering the costs and burdens of the
arms race" (16). Nuclear free zones can also be seen as essential
components in confidence-building structures that strengthen the
possibilities of peace (17). He then concludes that proponents of
the concept "are convinced that such zones can contribute to the
goals of general and complete disarmament, of curbing the
proliferation of nuclear weapons, of enhancing the security of
zone members by ensuring the total absence of nuclear weapons
from their territories, and providing the means for obtaining
security assurances from the nuclear powers against the threat or
use of nuclear weapons against members of the zone" (18).
The New Zealand Initiative.
In 1975 at the 5th SPF meeting in Tonga, Forum leaders gave
unanimous support to a New Zealand proposal for the establishment
of a NFZ in the South Pacific. As a result of general endorsement
of the idea by Forum members, New Zealand with Fiji wrote to the
United Nations Secretary General requesting that an item of a
South Pacific Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SPNWFZ) be included on
the agenda of the 30th session of the General Assembly (19).
Accompanying the letter was a draft resolution calling on member
states of the United Nations to "endorse the idea of establishing
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a NWFZ in the South Pacific in cooperation with the nuclear
powers and with the possible assistance of the UN Secretary
General" (20). The resolution in short called for the banning of
nuclear weapons in the region and an end to all testing.
Even before the resolution was to be tabled at the December
1975 General Assembly, it received a chilly reception,
particularly from the United States. U.S. concern was partly
based on the belief that a NFZ in the South Pacific would curtail
the freedom of movement of its military ships and aircraft in the
region. Secondly it feared that as the only nuclear weapons state
which deploys in the South Pacific, the NFZ would in effect have
unilaterally restricted it while not imposing similar constraints
on its strategic adversaries- the Soviet Union and China (21).
Thirdly the U.S. was concerned about its security alliance under
ANZUS which is in itself a security arrangement that oversees the
South Pacific region. As noted by Greg Fry, the ambiguities in
the New Zealand proposal heightened U.S. concerns:
From the U.S. point of view, the proposal was seen 8S
open-ended on the question of what constitutes nuclear
presence in the region. The New Zealand Government's
reported claim that it would not affect transit did not
placate American fears on the matter. New Zealand
assurances were negated by its reference to such a
proposal was also vague on the question of boundaries ...
this would also have concerned the U.S. because of the
possibility of its American territories being considered
part of the region (22).
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When the resolution eventually came for the General Assembly vote
on 11th December 1975, it was unanimously supported by a vote of
110 for the resolution, none against and 20 abstentions (23). Of
the five major nuclear weapon states, only China voted in favour
of the resolution. Britain, France, Soviet Union and the U.S.
expressed general sympathy, but abstained on the vote because of
fears for their rights on high seas (24).
The New Zealand initiative however was not pursued further
due to a change of Government in the country in 1975 (25).
According to Fry and Hediansky the New Zealand proposal's
failure to materialize into an action package was due in part to
Australian reluctance to go along with some issues in the
proposal, namely, reservations that it would disadvantage U.S.
strategic interests and its security arrangements in the South
Pacific. They also pointed out that the New Zealand proposal was
deficient in other ways, including the broad and ill defined
nature of its presentation. In all, however, its greatest
deficiency proved to be that it aroused the concern of Washington
which in turn aroused Australian doubts (26).
The Australian Proposal.
Like all South Pacific states, Australia has had a history
of denouncing French nuclear testing in the region. The platform
of the Australian Labor Party which came to office in March 1983
was committed to a wide range of arms control objectives (27).
Among these were a pledge to promote zones of peace and nuclear
free zones in the Indian and Pacific oceans (28). Angered over
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continued testing in April 1983, and building on the outcry
of South Pacific island states, Australian government statements
started mentioning moves to revive the Nuclear Free Zone concept
(29). At the 13th South Pacific Forum at Canberra in August 1983,
Australia formally presented its proposal.
The Australian proposal essentially sought to ban the use,
testing or stationing of nuclear explosive devices in the South
Pacific and provide that no South Pacific country would develop
or manufacture, or receive from others, or acquire or test any
nuclear explosive device (30). The proposal however recognizes the
unqualified security arrangements including access to its ports
and airfields by vessels and aircraft of other states (31).
The architects of the Australian proposal evidently took
care to avoid arousing U.S. opposition particularly where it
would disadvantage its strategic installations in Australia as
well as its security link under ANZUS. Hence as noted by
Mediansky, the "Australian Government presented its SPNFZ
proposal as a "political concept" aimed at furthering the
objectives of arms control within the provisions of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty. The main objective being to establish a
broadly endorsed regime to oppose French testing as well as to
ban dumping and the acquisition, storage or deployment of nuclear
weapons" (32). The proposal did not call for the prohibition of
existing nuclear weapons and weapons related involvement of the
nuclear weapons states such as port calls and other arrangements
that support the military posture of nuclear powers in the
region. Australian government officials gave repeated assurances
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on transit rights, port calls and the continued adherence to
existing security agreements.
The 13th SPF whilst commending the Australian proposal
reserved its initiative on the proposal and simply stated that
Australia had provided "a valuable contribution to establishing




Encouraged by the positive acknowledgment from island states
and New Zealand on its initiative, Australian officials between
the period of the Canberra Forum began to press for concerted
backing to its proposal. Thus by the time of the 15th SPF in
Tuvalu most states in the Forum had been convinced about moving
the proposal a step further. The Tuvalu Forum in its final
communique stated that it had "agreed on the desirability of
establishing a nuclear free zone in the region at the earliest
possible opportunity in accordance with the principles set in the
Australian working papers that had been circulated to the Forum
members" (34).
The 1984 SPF Mandate.
The Tuvalu SPF in August 1984 appointed a Working Group of
officials "to meet as often as may be required to undertake an
examination of the substantive legal and other issues involved in
establishing a nuclear free zone in the region with a view to
preparing a draft of a treaty for consideration by the Forum
meeting in 1985" (35).
In addition the Forum also directed the Working Group to
examine the proposal by Nauru to strengthen the London Dumping
Convention noting that "the dumping and disposal of nuclear waste
in the region was intolerable, and that Forum governments were
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strongly committed to this aspect of the convention and protocols
being negotiated under the auspices of the South Pacific Regional
Environmental Proaramme (SPREP)"(36).
The Forum appointed Australia to chair the Working Group and
directed that all members of the Forum would be entitled to take
part in the Working Group.
In addition to to its mandate, the Forum also agreed on a
set of principles they felt were of importance in their wanting a
treaty. These were:
i) South Pacific countries should enjoy peaceful, social and
economic development free from the threat of environmental
pollution.
ii) South Pacific countries acknowledge existing
international treaties such as the Charter of the United Nations,
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Law of the Sea
Convention which contribute to these objectives.
iii) South Pacific countries should be free to live in peace
and independence and to run their own affairs in accordance with
the wishes and traditions of their people.
iv) There should be no use, testing or stationing of nuclear
explosive devices in the South Pacific.
v) No South Pacific country would develop or manufacture or
receive others, or acquire or test any nuclear explosive device.
vi) Nuclear activities of South Pacific countries should be
in accordance with applicable international principles and
treaties, notably the Non-Proliferation Treaty and take into
account regional arrangements.
15
vii) South Pacific countries retain their unqualified
sovereign rights to decide for themselves, consistent with their
support for these objectives, their security arrangements, and
such questions as access to their ports and airfields by vessels
and aircraft of other countries.
viii) The importance of the principle of freedom of
navigation and overflight encompassed under international
law (37).
The Working Group Meetings.
The Working Group held five sessions between November 1984
to June 1985. From the Group, a Legal Drafting Committee was
appointed. Officials from 13 of the 14 member countries of the
Forum (including the Federated States of Micronesia which is an
Observer) took part in all of the sessions.
While much of the Working Group's overall approach to the
task was assisted by the Australian draft proposal, it
also drew on the provisions of existing international agreements
prohibiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and established
demilitarised and nuclear weapons free zones, notably the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) , the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the
Antarctic Treaty, the Seabed Arms Control Treaty and the Partial
Test Ban Treaty. The Working Group gave particular attention to
Article VII of the NPT which recognizes the right of any group of
states to conclude regional treaties so as to assure the total
absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories. Most
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South Pacific Forum countries are parties to the NPT and it was
considered that a SPNFZ Treaty would contribute to strengthen
global security and the international non-proliferation regime of
which the NPT is the corner stone (38).
The Working Group was of the view that the Treaty ought to
reflect broad and key concerns of the people of the Pacific. This
concern was a need to prevent the region from becoming a theatre
of super - power rivalry. It was recognized that a nuclear free
zone could not of itself fully meet the this concern and that the
region would inevitably be affected by developments in other
parts of the world.
The First Meeting
The First Heeting of the Working Group which met from 13
16 November 1984 in Suva, Fiji, was devoted wholly on
organizational and procedural matters. The Working Group at this
first session appointed a Legal Drafting Committee. This
Committee met at Suva from 17 to 21 December 1984. Apart from
this single session, the Legal Drafting Committee worked in
parallel with the Working Group throughout the negotiations.
The Second Meeting
The Working Group convened again in Canberra, Australia,
meeting from 29 January to 1 February 1985. All of the Forum
members participated with the exception of Tonga. Kiribati and
Solomon Islands who had not been able to attend the first meeting
were now present.
The Second Meeting devoted its time to reviewing the draft
text of the Treaty which was earlier scrutinized in December by
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the Legal Drafting Committee. One issue the meeting took some
time over was the use of nuclear materials for non-peaceful
purposes. On this the meeting felt that the proposed Treaty
should address it comprehensively. It felt that there were points
on this factor that would create difficulties, for example,
research programs or where military uses paralleled civilian
uses.
The question of nuclear-related facilities was also
extensively discussed. The meeting was told by the Australian
representative that Australia shared with the United States a
number of military facilities which did not contain weapons of
any sort and which in the view of the Australian Government were
an essential contribution to world peace. The Australian
representative told the meeting that in Australia's view, it saw
no need of creating a provision in the proposed Treaty that would
affect Australia's obligations with regard to these facilities.
The Australian representative noted however that these facilities
included some risks especially in an all out nuclear war.
The Third Heeting
By the time of the third meeting at Wellington, New Zealand
from 3 to 10 April 1985, the discussions over the draft Treaty
had become vigorous. The subject of major discussion was the
article on the dumping of nuclear waste. Some countries were of
the view that this article may not be relevant in the proposed
Treaty since a Convention on the Environment was being negotiated
at the same time which would therefore adequately cover the
issue. Despite these reservations however, it was agreed that an
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article on dumping would be included. The Federated States of
Micronesia proposed to the meeting for its territory to be
included in the zone boundary, and also requested for provisions
in the proposed Treaty to allow that country to sign it. The
meeting did not see any compelling reason to not allowing the
country's territory into the boundary of the zone, but was
reserved about the request to sign the proposed Treaty. The
difficulty as far as the meeting was concerned relates to the
matter of a sovereign power to enter into treaty arrangements. In
this case, the Federated States of Micronesia was not a
sovereign state as that term is understood under international
law.
After amending several clauses in the draft proposal, it was
agreed to have another meeting.
The Fourth Meeting
The fourth meeting took place at SPEC Headquarters from 13
to 21 June 1985. Kiribati, Tonga and Niue did not send
representatives. The fourth meeting in effect was one of
"ironing-out" basic disagreements and going over amendments that
were referred to the Drafting Committee during the last meeting.
The Fifth Meeting
The fifth meeting was again held in Suva, from 10-13 June
1985. Kiribati, Tonga and Niue were again absent.
The meeting in effect concluded discussions on outstanding issues
and had a draft text of a Treaty ready for the Forum meeting
being held in Rarotonga in August.
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Chapter IV
AN EXAMINATION OF THE ISSUES
In drafting the Treaty, the Working Group took into
consideration certain key concerns. Foremost was the fact that a
nuclear free zone could not of itself fully meet the
geographical, legal and substantive limits to which the actual
obligations imposed by a treaty were inevitably subject to.
In focusing on the issues involved, a number of constraints
were noted. These constraints were of three kinds; legal,
practical (in terms of verifiability), and tactical. The legal
constraints included the rights of all states in international
law to the freedom of the seas and of the airspace above the high
seas. Here the Working Group felt that any attempt to ban transit
through the high seas of the region by ships capable of carrying
nuclear weapons would be legally impossible. The practical
constraints was that even if the treaty came into force, the
proposed parties do not have, and are unlikely to have in the
forseeable future the capability to effectively monitor and
verify such a ban. It was felt that an attempt to apply one would
amount to no more than an exhortation leading to international
skepticism about a treaty as a whole. The third constraint
concerns weighing the desirability of having a treaty which stood
a strong chance of securing the support of most if not all of the
nuclear weapons states. In other words, the choice was whether to







include strong prohibitions as against a treaty which though even
broad in what it sought to prohibit would in practical terms be
ineffective.
After reviewing these constraints, the general
taken by the Working Group was expressed
"stretchinl' the fabric of the treaty to its
extent" .
Boundaries of the Zone
Article l(a) sets the boundary of the zone of which an annex
was attached to the treaty proper to describe and explain the
coordinates of the zone. In considering this provision of the
treaty, the Working Group decided on two approaches. The first
approach was termed an "incomplete patchwork approach, that is
with the zone confined to the territories of countries which
adhere to the treaty. The second approach was termed the
"diaarammatic approach", that is with a boundary line
circumscribing the Forum countries as well as larae areas of high
seas and abutting the existina nuclear weapon free zones in Latin
America and Antarctica. The latter was considered preferable
because, it was easier to visualize, clearly identified the
region to which the zone is intended to apply, and would
contribute to the development of a mosaic of present and planned
nuclear weapons free zones.
The fact however remains that Forum countries (like other
countries) are only able in relation to their own territories to
a much more limited extent, in areas of jurisdiction outside
their territory to undertake treaty obligations affectina the
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action of other states. As the editorial piece in Island
Business rightly put it, "the nuclear navies of Russia and
America will be able to steam their radio active waste where they
please through the region whenever they wish if they want to" (39).
Beyond that, Forum countries can only undertake treaty
obligations in relation to their own actions and activities on
their own ships and aircrafts.
The other major consideration the Workina Group had on this
Article was the borders of the zone, particularly the northern
border. Some countries were of the view that the zone should
extend well north of the equator to include the US Trust
Territory just as it extended east to include the French
territories. Here concern was expressed about the need to be
consistent vis a vis France and the US. The alternative chosen
was for the initial northern boundary of the zone not to go
beyond the Exclusive Economic Zones of the northern - most Forum
members, namely Nauru and Kiribati. This reflected concerns that,
inclusion of the US Trust Territory in the zone could
complicate the on-going negotiations on the constitutional future
of this area, especially since nuclear issues were a
major element in these negotiations (40). The Working Group
considered that this did not apply to the French Territories
where the issues facing the movement for independence was
different. Moreover, the reason for an eastern border that went
beyond the eastern-most Forum member was to have the SPNFZ abut
the Latin American NWFZ. There was no similar zone to the north,
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the proposed Indian Ocean Zone of Peace and the proposed South
East Asian NWFZ.
Some countries felt that the zone should simply comprise the
South Pacific Commission area boundary. However in the end it was
decided to have the zone as shown in the illustrative map.
Consideration was also made on the position of territories
of Forum members outside the zone, specifically the Antarctica
territories of Australia and New Zealand and the Indian ocean
islands of Australia. It was felt that the ri£orous provisions of
the Antarctica Treaty especially its verification and non-
military use articles would not be necessary or desirable to
apply the SPNFZ provisions to these territories. As to
Australia's Indian Ocean islands, they were included in the
zone.
Another major issue that arose from discussion of the
boundaries of the zone was whether the zone could accurately be
described as the "South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone". Some
preference was expressed for the term "Pacific" to make clear
that the equator did not restrict the zone, and to reflect long
established usage of the term in some Forum members own domestic
legislations on nuclear policies. It was felt however that since
the term "South Pacific" was generally of an international usage
and that it was fairly reflective of some of the regions
organizations such as the South Pacific Commission, the South
Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation and the South Pacific
Forum itself, the term South Pacific should be retained. Vanuatu
and Nauru held reservations on the matter, because in Vanuatu's
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view the "people of the Pacific understood this term better than
the term South Pacific" (41).
Discussion on the appropriateness of the term "Nuclear Free"
was also an issue. It was felt that it was beyond the powers of
Forum members even if they wished to do so, to exclude all things
nuclear from the zone and moreover whatever was to be done in the
zone would remain part of a world in which nuclear weapons exist
and peaceful uses of nuclear energy were widespread. In this
connection, no freedom is absolute and that the term "nuclear
weapon free zone" was widely established in the United Nations
and other international usage for example the Latin American and
Antarctica zones which do not preclude transit or visits by
nuclear armed ships. The view was expressed that "nuclear free"
appropriately reflected long established popular usage in Forum
member countries.
Renunciation of Nuclear Explosive Devices
The issue of the renunciation of nuclear explosive devices
was of some contention to the drafters of the treaty. Here the
problem concerned the means of transport or delivery of a
nuclear weapon or device and whether these should be excluded
from the definition of a nuclear explosive device if they were
separable and not part of the device. It was agreed that the term
"nuclear explosive device" was adequate since technically and in
non-proliferation terms, distinguishing between "peaceful nuclear
explosive devices" and "nuclear explosive devices" was nigh
impossible.
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It was agreed that parties to the treaty should not
manufacture, acquire, possess or have control over any nuclear
explosive device inside or outside the zone. Thus the provision
under Article 3 prohibits parties to the treaty from receiving
assistance to manufacture nuclear devices, supplying nuclear
material, equipment or technology to any country for use in
explosive devices.
The provision under which parties to the treaty would not
undertake to cooperate in activities which they did not wish to
take place in the South Pacific region is incorporated under
Article 3(c). This clause is meant to be understood as to relate
to any "deliberate action either positive or permissive to
facilitate such activity. It was understood to exclude actions
which have other intended purposes but might intentionally and
incidentally assist the activities mentioned" (42).
Peaceful Nuclear Activities
The Working Group addressed the question of peaceful nuclear
activities. It was judged desirable to define the conditions to
apply to the transfer of nuclear items and to require that such
transfers take place under International Atomic and EneraY Agency
(IAEA) safeguards and in accordance with strict non-proliferation
conditions. The Working Group considered that endorsement of
this principle would help encourage its universal acceptance.
Prevention of Stationing of Nuclear Explosive Devices




respective policies on stationing nuclear devices. With
exception of New Zealand and Vanuatu, all countries of the
allow nuclear powered ships and aircraft to its ports and
airfields.
Although Article 5(1) states that Forum members should
undertake to prevent the stationing of nuclear explosive device
in their territory, Article 5(2) leaves it to each sovereign
state the right to decide for itself whether to allow visits by
foreign ships to enter its ports and airfields, transit of its
airspace by foreian aircraft and navigation of foreian ships in
its territorial sea not covered by the right of innocent passage.
The question that arises is how do one define stationing? It was
accepted that the definition should be rigorous and should cover
the emplantation, emplacement, transport on land or on internal
waters, stockpiling, storage, installation and deployment of
nuclear explosive devices in the territories of the parties to
the treaty.
The issue of a time element to cover the duration or pattern
of port visits was also addressed. The Working Group in their
consideration of the issue noted that the right of countries to
decide on port access was unqualified. It was felt that the
utility of such a time frame was questionable since the
circumstances of port visits varied considerably.
Prevention of Testing of Nuclear Explosive Devices
Article 6 merely reaffirm the countries of the Forum's
opposition to the testing of nuclear explosive devices in the
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region.
Prevention of Dumping at Sea
Mindful of the fact that the dumping of radio active wastes
would be incorporated into the SPREP Convention, the inclusion of
an article on dumping in the treaty was seen as to assist rather
than impede the SPF objective in an outcome of the SPREP
negotiations. Hence the treaty provides that countries of SPF
undertake not to dump inside nor outside the treaty zone and to
support the Convention on the Environment that were being
negotiated under SPREP.
Consideration was given to the possibility of a fourth
protocol to the treaty which would invite potential dumpers to
undertake commitments against dumping in the zone. During the
meetings of the Working Group the prevalent view was that this
would be inconsistent with the Forum objective of a successful
outcome to the SPREP negotiations. In the light of these views it
was agreed not to propose a protocol. One of the preoccupation of
the Working Group was to avoid creating two different dumping
regimes in the region (one under SPREP and the other under the
SPNFZ). The concern was that both documents should preclude any
and all dumping at sea of radioactive material such as would give
rise to concerns on the part of the SPF.
Control Systems
Article 8 establishes a control system for the purpose of
verifying compliance with obligations to the treaty. The bases of
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the verification system are the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) safeguards to verify the non-diversion of nuclear
material from peaceful uses to the manufacture of nuclear
explosive devices and a system of possible challenge on-site
inspections controlled by a Consultative Committee comprising
representatives of all parties to the treaty.
The treaty partners did however agree to provide for more
informal bilateral and multilateral consultations in order to
clarify any questions that may arise about the implementation of
the treaty.
Consultations, Review and Amendment
The treaty establishes a Consultative Committee to hear
complaints by parties over breaches of obligations to the treaty.
The drafters of the treaty felt that by having a Consultative
Committee there would be no need to institutionalise a regular
review of the treaty. The treaty also includes an amendment
provision under which proposals for amendment would be considered
by the Consultative Committee and would require consensus support
to be adopted.
Withdrawl
The Working Group in its discussions were at odds whether to
have a withdrawl clause should be provided in the treaty. Some
thought that a withdrawl clause was unnecessary and some argued




The Protocols seek undertakin8s by:
(i) France, the United Kingdom and the United States to
apply key provisions of the Treaty to their territories
within the zone;
(ii) the five nuclear weapons states not to undermine the
Treaty and not to use or threaten to use nuclear
weapons a8ainst parties to it or the territories in
(i); and
(iii) the five nuclear weapons states not to test nuclear
weapons anywhere within the zone.
Role of Director of SPEC
The treaty ascribes several functions to the Director of
SPEC including that of Depositary, as well as a role in
circulating reports and makin8 arran8ements for the convening of
the Consultative Committee.
The Vanuatu Stand
Since its sianing Vanuatu has been one of the most ardent
critic of the SPNFZ Treaty. At the 16th Forum in Rarotonga, Prime
Minister Lini defended his country's position and explained why
he couldn't sign the Treaty. There was he said provisions in the
Treaty that Vanuatu was unhappy about and they were crucial to a
comprehensive SPNFZ.
In respect of the boundary of the zone, he pointed out that
since New Caledonia, Wallis Futuna and French Polynesia were
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included in the zone, the French Government was likely to regard
the treaty as being directed solely against France. On the title
of the treaty he said that "the South Pacific Nuclear Zone did
not convey the intended meaning of the scope of the treaty. In
Vanuatu's view the title could have been more realistically
referred to as the Pacific Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty" (43).
He also had reservations about the Article relating to nuclear
explosive devices since no appropriate definition of delivery
systems had been incorporated. On the issue of peaceful uses of
nuclear materials, Vanuatu's belief was that it was morally
unacceptable for parties to provide nuclear materials such as
uranium for nuclear weapons states. This of course was an obvious
reference to Australia, who was the only exporter of uranium in
the region. It was pointed out that Vanuatu was not a party to
the NPT. In regards to provisions on the prevention of stationing
of nuclear explosive devices, Vanuatu held reservations on
Article 5(2) of the Treaty since in her view, there was a
desirability of incorporating a time element which would be used
as a basis to differentiate between port calls and stationing.
Vanuatu was also concerned that although Article 7 substantially
covered the issues of dumping at sea, the notion of disposal was
not covered. It felt therefore that this issue should have been
addressed substantively in the Treaty rather than in the SPREP
Convention. Finally it was concerned that the Treaty had not
addressed the need to ensure against possibilities of abusing
rights of high seas freedom.
In order to grasp Vanuatu's reservations, it would seem
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appropriate to examine the Treaty itself to see whether the seed
of the problem lay there. On the question of the boundary of the
zone, the Treaty in fact has not excluded US interest such as
American Samoa. Neither did it exclude Britain's interest in the
case of Pitcairn Island. One could argue therefore that the
Treaty was not anti-French. With regards to the use of the term
Pacific, there seems to be some sense in retaining its usage
Vanuatu says, because there could be a probability that countries
north of the equator may someday wish to associate themselves
with the Treaty. On the other hand there does not seem to be any
real urgency to it, since there is room to amend the Treaty if it
was so desired in the future. On the question of delivery
systems, the Working Group in fact had difficulty in categorizing
the means of transport or delivery systems. the problem was the
Treaty as it stood could allow the installation of facilities
such as rocket launchers, or activities such as missile testing
in the zone. In that respect there was no way of knowing whether
these missiles were carrying nuclear warheads.
Some observers have tried to deduce some reasons for
Vanuatu's stand in not signing the Treaty. Some attribute it to
inconsistencies in overall Vanuatu Government policies. Others
say it is due to the anti-colonial hangover which those in the
policy decision areas still retains, whilst others argue that it
is based on a moral obligation which the Vanuatu Government is
genuinely committed to upholding. Whichever it may be, the Treaty





TREATY AND THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO; A COMPARATIVE
The 1985 SPNFZ Treaty is modeled on the Treaty of Tlatelolco,
signed on February 14, 1967 by thirteen Latin American states.
The Treaty which is longer than the SPNFZ Treaty (31 Articles and
2 Protocols), constituted the first successful effort at creating
a nuclear free zone for an inhabited portion of the earth.
Although this Chapter is primarily concerned with examining
the differences and similarities between the two Treaties, it
also looks briefly at past attempts to introduce the concept of a
nuclear free zone into the two regions. In this connection it is
interesting to note that there were indeed parallels between
previous Latin American proposals and the ill-fated New Zealand
proposal. Some pertinent questions that could be raised in
regards to this are: What factors promoted the effort to
denuclearise the two regions? Conversely, were the factors that
promoted the effort necessarily the same? What retarded some of
the earlier proposals? Were the goals the same in each of the two
regions? We examine these questions in the first instance.
As noted in Chapter II, the first concrete effort to set
about nuclear free zone in the Southwest Pacific was that
by New Zealand. In the case of Latin America, it had taken
three proposals before a Treaty was finally negotiated. These
proposals were the Costa Rican proposal of 1958, the Chilean
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proposal of 1960, and the Five President's Declaration of 1963,
the latter eventually forging the path towards negotiation of the
Treaty of Tlatelolco. The first two proposals which called for
general arms control or arms limitation on the part of all Latin
American countries were rejected by the Organization of American
States (44). One could generalize that the fate that befell the
Costa Rican and the Chilean proposals were of some par with what
happened with the New Zealand proposal of 1975. According to
Stinson and Cochrane, the Costa Rican and Chilean proposals did
not have support from the Latin American states because it did
not evoke much interest, particularly political support, and that
the proposals were presented rather bluntly. In the case of the
New Zealand proposal, the SPF did in fact support it, until the
US came into the picture. The US opposition and the lack of
Australian support eventually sealed its fate. Hediansky argues
also that another reason why the New Zealand proposal did not
receive favourable response from its allies was the broad and
ill-defined nature of its presentation (45).
It is perhaps opportune to ask, what were the factors that
retarded the Costa Rican, Chilean and New Zealand proposals?
Several factors appear to be responsible. Whitaker and Jordan
offer a few of them: security, US policy and prestige
considerations. In the case of Latin American countries, the
authors argue that national security has not been the major
concern of the Latin American countries, given the fact that
they have not been subject to any serious external military
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threat since early in the nineteenth century. Their present
military weakness has left the burden of hemispheric defence to
the US (46). Likewise in the case of the South Pacific, security
has not been of particular concern save perhaps the threat from
Indonesia against Papua New Guinea. The South Pacific states also
see their security interests served by the US, in particular the
ANZUS alliance. In both regions however, security concerns have
not been a factor in calling for a nuclear free zone treaty.
With respect to US policy; in Latin America, US policy
stressed regional or collective defence. Latin America was seen
by the US as a region that might affect not only the security of
Latin America, but the security of the US as well (47). With
reference to the two arms oontrol proposals, the US took a
somewhat ambivalent position. The US did not support the Costa
Rican proposal, although it did not rejeot it either (48). The US
endorsed the Chilean proposal but did so without any real
enthusiasm (49). The US position on nuolear free zones in the
South Pacific is generally one of acceptanoe, 8S long as it did
not disturb tneoessary security arrangements', and were capable
of adequate verification (50).
Just as there were factors that worked against the Costa
Rican, Chilean and New Zealand proposals, there were also factors
that promoted the effort to ban nuclear weapons from the two
regions. In both regions, while security considerations is
considered imperative, by the same token it was felt that the use
of nuclear weapons was considered a security threat.
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Differences in the two Treaties
1. Zones of the Treaties
The geographical extent of the Treaty of Tlatelolco is in an
article by itself ( Article 4 ), whereas the Treaty of
Rarotonga's definition is encompassed in Annex 1 which is
attached to the Treaty proper. According to Golblat and Lodgaard
of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),
the geographical extent of the Treaty of Tlatelolco is
considerably larger than the Treaty of Rarotonga (51). They point
out that although the Treaty of Rarotonga sets the borders of the
zone to the east to meet with the Treaty of Tlatelolco and to the
south to the border of the Antarctica demilitarised zone, it bans
the presence of nuclear weapons only within territories of South
Pacific states up to the 12 mile territorial sea limit. The
Rarotonga Treaty did not seek through additional Protocols or
otherwise to have nuclear prohibitions applied to the larger
ocean area. The zone of application of the Treaty of Tlatelolco
however include large areas in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans in
addition to the territories of the countries. In this respect
international law regarding the freedom of the seas did not stand
in the way of banning nuclear weapons from the high seas under
the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Goldblat and Lodgaard then infer that
there seems no reason why it should have been an obstacle in
introducing a similar restriction voluntarily in a separate
document under the SPNFZ Treaty (52).
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2. Explosions for peaceful purposes
The Treaty of Tlatelolco permitted nuclear explosions for
peaceful purposes ( Article 18 ). The Treaty of Rarotonga however
bans such explosions (Article 4). To the drafters of the
Rarotonga Treaty, no distinction could be drawn between tests
for peaceful purposes and tests for warlike purposes.
3. Prevention of Dumping
The Treaty of Tlatelolco placed no ban on the dumping of
radio-active wastes and other radio-active materials at sea. The
Treaty of Rarotonga bans this under Article 7. This is perhaps
the more innovative provision of the Treaty of Rarotonga.
4.Principal organizations to ensure compliance with the Treaties
The two Treaties designate their respective bodies to be a
watch-dog for the treaty. In the case of the Treaty of Tlatelolco
the principal organ is the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America, referred to as the Agency (Article 7).
Within this Agency, two other bodies are establishedj a Council
and a Secretariat. Their role is set out under Article 10 and
Article 11 respectively. On the other hand, under the Treaty of
Rarotonga, there is only one principal organ, that being the
Consultative Committee. Instead of a specific Article being
designated for this Committee, its functions are setforth in
Annex 3.
5. Measures in the event of violation of the Treaties
The Treaty of Tlatelolco unlike the Treaty of Rarotonga
expands on the steps which it will take on the matter of Parties
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violating the Treaty. In the case of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, if
a contracting party is not complying with its obligations, it is
made known to that party. If further found that non-compliance
has constituted a violation, it is taken to the Security Council
of the United Nations and thereafter to the General Assembly of
the UN. These steps are not included in the Treaty of Rarotonga.
Similarities in the two Treaties
The Treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga do not ban testing
within the zones of delivery systems for nuclear weapons. Neither
do they ban access to ports and airfields of vessels and
aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. Both treaties provide in an
additional protocol for an undertaking by the nuclear weapons
states not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the
parties. In the view of Goldblat and Lodgaard, this requirement
was probably warranted in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, however, this
could have been left out of the Treaty of Rarotonga given the
fact that all nuclear weapons states have already unilaterally




The signing of the SPNFZ Treaty in August 1985 did not
complete the effort to have a nuclear free zone in the South
Pacific. Major hurdles remain - to have the rest of the SPF
members sign the Treaty, ratification of the Treaty by the
signatories and compliance by the major nuclear weapon states of
the Protocol to the Treaty.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, several countries have renounced
the Treaty, whilst others are thinking of defecting on their
earlier commitment. There is also a third group whose position is
still in the balance. Of the first group, we have Vanuatu and the
Solomon Islands who have voiced their dissatisfaction with the
Treaty for reasons that it was "watered down". It could be added
that Vanuatu may have been perturbed at the manner in which the
Treaty was hastily passed by the SPF in Rarotonga. Evidence of
this was during the debate on whether the draft treaty proposal
was to be "adopted" or "opened" for signature. The Prime Minister
of Vanuatu had raised the point on what was meant by the word
"adoption", He pointed out that in light of his country's
reservations, he would not be able to sign the Treaty. He asked
for clarification on the differences between the words "adoption"
and "endorsement", The Vanuatu Prime Minister added that it was
important that "consensus should be reached on all issues
regarding the draft treaty". The Working Group he said had
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concluded a draft, but he was unsure as to whether consensus was
reached to the extent that the Forum could approve it. Hence, if
there was an approval of the Treaty by the Forum, he would wish
to disassociate Vanuatu from such a decision" (54). In the ensuing
debate, Papua New Guinea's Prime Minister, Michael Somare
suggested that the draft treaty be "endorsed" rather than
"adopted" in view of the reservations by Vanuatu and keeping with
the tradition of reaching decisions on the basis of consensus. He
recommended that the Forum endorse the draft treaty which would
enable member countries with strong reservations time to consider
and study carefully the text before they added their signatures.
The Australian Prime Minister then recommended that in the spirit
of consensus, his country would not insist on the word "adoption"
but if the word "endorsement" allowed opening the Treaty to
signature then he was willing to sign it. The matter ended on
that note and the draft proposal was opened for signature (55).
The Solomon Islands position was was also made known at the
Rarotonga Forum ( Solomon Islands being represented by its Deputy
Prime Minister Hon. Paul Tovua). Solomon Islands noted at that
Forum that although it supported a nuclear free zone, it wanted
clarification on some areas, notably, a) Australia's stance on
its export of uranium, b) the question of France and its
territories in the treaty area, c) the precise conditions of
dumping, and d) the international rights of navigation on the
high seas (56). He further indicated that he had no mandate to
sign the treaty at Rarotonga Forum.
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The position of the Cook IslandsAsomewhat confusing and
contradictory. At a meeting in Suva in May 1986, the Cook Islands
Prime Minister Sir Thomas Davis claimed that ratification of the
Treaty would mean the end of the ANZUS defence alliance between
Australia, New Zealand and the US. The New Zealand Foreian
Minister, Mr Palmer in criticizing the comments noted that the
Cook Prime Minister's views on the subject" was extraordinary,
because the Cook Islands was one of the first countries to ratify
the nuclear free zone Treaty" (57).
The third group which has yet to take a stand is Nauru and
Tonga. According to David Robie, .. Nauru has strong anti-nuclear
views while Tonga has a conservative stance and is anxious not to
upset the US" (58).
With respect to ratifying the Treaty, only three countries
have done so at the present time- Cook Islands, Fiji, and Niue.
Compliance by outside powers ( nuclear weapon states) is
still uncertain. At the end of the Rarotonga Forum, a mission was
sent to the five principal nuclear weapon states to explain and
request them to comply with the Treaty. This mission will be
reporting to the 17th SPF in Suva, Fiji from the 11-12 August
1986.
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Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
in Latin America
Preamble
In the name of their peoples and faithfully interpreting their desires
and aspirations, the Governments of the States which have signed the
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America,
Desiring to contribute, so far as lies in their power, towards ending
the armaments race, especially in the field of nuclear weapons, and
towards strengthening a world at peace, based on the sovereign equality
of States, mutual respect and good neighbourliness,
Recalling that the United Nations General Assembly, in its resolu-
tion 808 (IX), adopted unanimously as one of the three points of a
co-ordinated programme of disarmament "the total prohibition of the
use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruc·
tion of every type,"
Recalling that militarily denuclearized zones are not an end in them·
selves but rather a means for achieving general and complete disarma-
ment at a later stage,
Recalling United Nations General Assembly resolution 1911 (XVIII),
which established that the measures that should be agreed upon for the
denuclearization of Latin America should be taken "in the light of the
princi,pl~s of the Charter of the United Nations and of regional agree·
ments,"
Recalling United Nations General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX),
which established the principle of an acceptable balance of mutual
responsibilities and duties for the nuclear and non-nuclear powers, and
Recalling that the Charter of the Organization of American States
proclaims that it is an essential purpose of the organization to strengthen
the peace and security of the hemisphere,
Signed at Mexico City on 14 February 1967.
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, i
That the incalculable destructive power of nuclear weapons has made
it imperative that the legal prohibition of war should be strictly observed
in practice if the survival of civilization and of mankind itself is to be
assured,
That nuclear weapons, whose terrible effects are suffered, indis-
criminately and inexorably, by military forces and civilian population
alike, constitute, through the persistence of the radioactivity they re-
lease, an attack on the integrity of the human species and ultimately
may even render the whole earth uninhabitable,
That general and complete disarmament under effective international
control is a vital matter which all the peoples of the world equally
demand,
That the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which seems inevitable
unless States, in the exercise of their sovereign rights, impose restric-
tions on themselves in order to prevent it, would make any agreement
on disarmament enormously difficult and would increase the danger of
the outbreak of a nuclear conflagration,
That the establishment of militarily denuclearized zones is closely
linked with the maintenance of peace and security in the respective
regions,
. That the military denuclearization of vast geographical zones, adopted
by the sovereign"decision of the States comprised therein, will exercise
a beneficial influence on other regions where similar conditions exist,
That the privileged situation of the signatory States, whose territories
are wholly free from nuclear weapons, imposes upon them the inescapable
duty of preserving that situation both in their own interests and for the
good of mankind,
That the existence of nuclear weapons in any country of Latin
America would make it a target for possible nuclear attacks and would
inevitably set off, throughout the region, a ruinous race in nuclear weap-
ons which would involve the unjustifiable diversion, for warlike pur·
poses, of the resources required for economic and social development,
That the foregoing reasons, together with the traditional peace-loving
outlook of Latin America, give rise to an inescapable necessity that
nuclear energy should be used in that region exclusively for peaceful
purposes, and that the Latin American countries should use their right
to the greatest and most equitable possible access to this new source
of energy in order to expedite the economic and social development of
their peoples,
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Convinced finally:
That the military denuclearization of Latin America-being under-
stood to mean the undertaking entered into internatilmally in this
Treaty to keep their territories forever free from nuclear weapons-
will constitute a measure which will spare their peoples from the
squandering of their limited resources on nuclear armaments and will
protect them against possible nuclear attacks on their territories, and
will also constitute a significant contribution towards preventing the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and a powerful factor for general and
complete disarmament, and
That Latin America, faithful to its tradition of universality, must not
only endeavour to banish from its homelands the scourge of a nuclear
war, but must also strive to promote the well·being and advancement
of its peoples, at the same time co·operating in the fulfilment of the
ideals of mankind, that is to say, in the consolidation of a permanent
peace based on equal rights, economic fairness and social justice for
all, in accordance with the principles and purposes set forth in the
Charter of the United Nations and in the Charter of the Organization
of American States,
Have agreed as follows:
Obligations
ARTICLE 1
1. 'The Contracting Parties hereby undertake to use exclusively for
peaceful purposes the nuclear material and facilities which are under
their jurisdiction, and to prohibit and prevent in their respective
territories:
(a) Tbe testing, use, manufacture, production ()r acquisition by
any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons, by the Parties them-
selves, directly or indirectly, on behalf of anyone else or in any other
way; and
(b) The receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of
possession of any nuclear weapon, directly or indirectly, by the Parties
themselves, by anyone on their behalf or in any other way.
2, The Contracting Parties also undertake to refrain from engag·
ing in, encouraging or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or in any way
participating in the testing, use, manufacture, production, possession or
control of any nuclear weapon.
Definition of the Contracting Parties
ARTICLE 2
For the purposes of this Treaty, the Contracting Parties are those for
whom the Treaty is in force.
Definition of territory
ARTICLE 3
For the purposes of this Treaty, the term "territory" shall include the
territorial sea, air space and any other space over which the State exer-
cises sovereignty in accordance with its own legislation.
Zone of application
ARTICLE 4
1. The zone of application of the Treaty is the whole of the terri-
tories for which the Treaty is in force.
2. Upon fulfilment of the requircments of article 28, paragraph 1,
the rone of application of the Treaty shall also be that which is situated
in the western hemisphere within the following limits (except the con-
tinental part of the territory of the United States of America and its
territorial waters): starting at a point locatcd at 35° north latitude, 75°
west longitude; from this point directly southward to a point at 30°
north latitude, 75° west longitude; from there, directly eastward to a
point at 30° north latitude, 50° west longitude; from there along a loxo-
dromic line to a point at 5° north latitude, 20° west longitude; from
there directly southward to a point at 60° south latitude, 20° west
longitude; from there directly westward to a point at 60° south lati-
tude, U5° west longitude; from there directly northward to a point
at 0° latitude, ll5° west longitude; from there along a loxodromic
line to a point at 35° north latitude, 150° west longitude; from there
directly eastward to a point at 35° north latitude, 75° west longitude.
Definition of nuclear weapons




For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear weapon is any device which
is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and
which has a group of characteristics that are appropriate for use for
warlike purposes. An instrument that may be used for the transport or
propulsion of the device is not included in this definition if it is sep-
arable from the device and not an indivisible part thereof.
Meeting of signatories
ARTICLE 6
At the request of any of the signatories, or if the Agency established
by article 7 should so decide, a meeting of all the signatories may be
convoked to consider in common questions which may affect the very
essence of this instrument, including possible amendments to it. In
either case, the meeting will be convoked by the General Secretary.
Organization
ARTICLE 7
1. In order to ensure compliance with the obligations of this Treaty,
the Contracting Parties hereby establish an international organization to
be known as the "Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in
Latin America," hereinafter referred to as "the Agency." Only the
Contracting Parties shall be affected by its decisioml.
2. The Agency shall be responsible for the holding of periodic or
extraordinary consultations among member States on mattcrs relating
to the purposes, measures and procedures set forth in this Treaty and
to supervision of compliance with the obligations arising therefrom.
3. The Contracting Parties agree to extend to the Agency full and
prompt co-operation in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty,
of any agreements they may conclude with the Agency and of any
agreements the Agency may conclude with any other international
organization or body.
4. Thc headquarters of the Agency shall be in Mexico City.
ARTICLE 8
1. There are hereby established as principal organs of the Agency
a General Conference, a Council and a Secretariat.
2. Such subsidiary organs as are considered necessary by the Gen-
eral Confercncc may be establishcd within the purview of this Treaty.
The General Conference
ARTICLE 9
1. The General Conference, the supreme organ of the Agency, shall
be composed of all the Contracting Parties; it shall hold regular ses-
sions every two years, and may also hold special sessions whenever this
Treaty so provides, or, in the opinion of the Council, the circumstances
so require.
2. The General Conference:
(a) May consider and decide on matters or questions covered by
the Treaty, within the limits thereof, including those referring to powers
and functions of any organ provided for in this Treaty.
(b) Shall establish procedures for the control system to ensure
. observance of this Treaty in accordance with its provisions.
(c) Shall elect the members of the Council and the Gencral
Secretary.
(el) May remove the General Secretary from office if the proper
functioning of the Agency so requires.
(e) Shall receive and consider the biennial and special reports
submitted by the Council and the General Secretary.
if) Shall initiate and consider studies designed to facilitate the
optimum fulfilment of the aims of this Trcaty, without prejudice to the
power of the General Secretary independently to carry out similar
studies for submission to and consideration by the Conference.
(g) Shall be the organ competent to authorize the conclusion of
agreements with Governments and other international organizations and
bodies.
3. The General Conference shall adopt the Agency's budget and
fix the scale of financial contributions to be paid by member States,
taking into account the systems and criteria used for the same purpose






1. The Council shall be composed of five members of the Agency
elected by the General Conference from among the Contracting Parties,
due account being taken of equitable geographical distribution.
2. The members of the Council shall be elected for a term of four
years. However, in the first election three will be eleeted for two years.
Outgoing members may not be re·elected for the following period
unless the limitcd number of States for which the Treaty is in force so
requires.
3. Each member of the Council shall have one representative.
4. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to function
continuously.
5. In addition to the functions conferred upon it !by this Treaty and
to those which may be assigned to it by the General Conference, the
Council shall, through the General Secretary, ensure the proper opera·
tion of the control system in accordance with the provisions of this
Treaty and with the decisions adopted by the General Conference.
6. The Council shall submit an annual report on its work to the
General Conference as well as such special reports as it deems neces-
sary or which the General Conference requests of it.
7. The Council shall elect its officers for each session.
8. The decisions of the Council shall be taken by a simple majority
of its members present and voting.
9. The Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure.
1. The Secretariat shall consist of a General Secretary, who shall
be the chief administrative officer of the Agency, and of such staff as
the Agency may require. The term of office of the General Secretary
shall be four years and he may be re·elected for a single additional
term. The General Secretary may not be a national of the country in
which the Agency has its headquarters. In case the offtce of General
Secretary becomes vacant, a new election shall be held to fill the office
for the remainder of the term.
2. The staff of the Secretariat shall be appointed by the General
Secretary, in accordance with rules laid down by the General Conference.
3. In addition to the functions conferred upon him by this Treaty
and to those which may be. assigned to him by the General Conference,
the General Secretary shall ensure, as provided by article 10, para-
graph 5, the proper operation of the control system established by this
Treaty, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and the deci-
sions taken by the General Conference.
4. The General Secretary shall act in that capacity in all meetings
of the General Conference and of the Couneil and shall make an an-
nual report to both bodies on the work of the Agency and any special
reports requested by the General Confcrence or the Councilor which
the General Secretary may deem desirable.
5. The General Secretary shall establish the procedures for dis·
tributing to all Contracting Parties information received by the Agency
from governmental sources, and such information from non-governmental
sources as may be of interest to the Agency.
6. In the performance of their duties, the General Secretary and
the ~taff shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government
or from any other authority external to the Agency and shall refrain
from any action which might reflect on their position as international
officials responsible only to the Agency; subject to their responsibility
to the Agency, they shall not disclose any industrial secrets or other
confidential information coming to their knowledge by reason of their
official duties in the Agency.
7. Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to respect the ex·
clusively international character of the responsibilities of the General
Secretary and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the dis-
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4. The General Conference shall elect its ollicers for each session
and may establish such subsiJiary organs as it deems necessary for the
performance of its functions.
S. Each member of the Agency shall have one vote. The decisions
of the General Conference shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of
the members present and voting in the case of matters relating to the
control system and measures referred to in article 20, the admission of
new members, the election or removal of the General Secretary, adop.
tion of the budget and matters related thereto. Decisions on other mat·
ters, as well as procedural questions, and also determination of which
questions must be decidcJ by a two·thirds majority, shall be taken by
a simple majority of the members present and voting.
6. The General Conference shall adopt its own mles of procedure.
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1. For the purpose of verifying compliance with the obligations
entered into by the Contracting Parties in accordance with article 1,
a control system shall be established which shall be put into effect in
accordance with the provisions of articles 13-18 of this Treaty.
2. The control system shall be used in particular for the purpose
of verifying:
(a) That devices, services and facilities intended for peaceful
uses of nuclear energy are not used in the testing or manufacture of
nuclear weapons;
(b) That none of the activities prohibited in article 1 of this
Treaty are carried out in the territory of the Contracting Parties with
nuclear materials or weapons introduced from abroad, and
(c) That explosions for peaceful purposes are compatible with
article 18 of this Treaty.
IAEA safeguards
ARTICLE 13
Each Contracting Party shall negotiate multilateral or bilateral agree-
ments with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the applica-
tion of its safeguards to its nuclear activities. Each Contracting Party
shall initiate negotiations within a period of 180 days after the date of
the deposit of its instrument of ratification of this Treaty. These agree·
ments shall enter into force, for each Party, not later than eighteen
months after the date of the initiation of such negotiations except in
case of unforeseen circumstances or force majeure.
. Reports of the parties
ARTICLE 14
1. The Contracting Parties shall submit to the Agency and to the
International Atomic Energy Agency, for their information, semi-annual
reports stating that no activity prohibited under this Treaty has occurred
in their respective territories.





Agcncy a copy of any report thcy may submit to the International
Atomic Energy Agency which relates to matters that are the 8ubject
of this Treaty and to the application of safeguards.
3. The Contracting Parties shall also transmit to the Organization
of American States, for its information, any reports that may be of
interest to it, in accordance with the obligations established by the
Inter·Amcrican System.
Special reports req~sted by the General Secretary
ARTICLE 15
1. With the authorization of the Council, the General Secretary may
request any of the Contracting Parties to provide the Agency with
complementary or supplementary information regarding any event or
circumstance connected with compliance with this Treaty, explaining
his reasons. The Contracting Parties undertake to co-opera!e promptly
and fully with the General Secretary.
2. The General Secretary shall inform the Council and the Con-
tracting Parties forthwith of such requests and of the respective replies.
Special inspections
'ARTICLE 16
1. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the Council es·
tablished by this Treaty have the power of carrying out special inspec-
tions in the following cases:
(a) In the case of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in
accordance with the agreements referred to in article 13 of the Treaty;
(b) In the case of the Council:
(i) When so requested, the reasons for the request being stated,
by any Party which suspects that some activity prohibited by this Treaty
has been carried out or is about to be carried out, either in the terri·
tory of any other Party or in any other place on such latter Party's
.behalf, the Council shall immediately arrange for such an inspection
in accordance with article 10, paragraph 5.
(ii) When requested by any Party which has been suspected of or
charged with having violated the Treaty, the Council shall immediately
arrange for the special inspection requested, in accordance with article
10, paragraph 5.
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The above requests will be made to the Council through the General
Secretary.
Appendix II
Use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
ARTICLE 17
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2. The costs and cxpenses of any special inspection carried out
under paragraph 1. sub-paragraph (Ii). sections (i) and (ii) of this article
shall be borne by the requesting Party or Parties. except where the
Council concludes on the basis of the report on the special inspection
that. in view of the circumstances existing in the case, such costs and
expenscs should be borne by the Agency.
3. The General Conference shall formulate the procedures for the
organization and execution of the special inspections carried out in
accordance with paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (Ii), sections (i) and (ii) of
this article.
4. The Contracting Parties undertake to grant the inspectors carry·
ing out such special inspections full and free access to all places and
all information which may be necessary for the performance of their
duties and which are directly and intimately connected with the sus-
picion of violation of this Treaty. If so requested by the Contracting
Party in whose territury the inspection is carried out, the inspectors
designated by the General Conference shall be accompanied by repre·
sentatives of the authorities of that Contracting Party, provided that
this docs not in any way delay or hinder the work of the inspectors.
S. The Council shall immediately transmit to all the Parties. through
the Gencral Secretary, a copy of any report resulting from special
inspcctions.
6. Similarly, the Council shall send through the Ccneral Secretary
to the Secretary.General of the United Nations for transmission to the
United Nations Security Council and General Assembly. and to the
Council of the Organization of American States for illS information, a
copy of any report resulting from any special inspection carried out in
accordance with paragraph 1, sub'paragraph (Ii). sections (i) and (ii) of
this article.
7. The Council may decide, or any Contracting Party may request,
the convcning of a special session of the General Conference for the
purpose of considering the reports resulting from any special inspection.
In such a ease. the Ceneral Secretary shall take immediate steps to
convene the special session requestcd.
8. The General Conferencc. convened in special session under this
article, may make recommendations to the Contracting Parties and
submit reports to the Secretary-General of the United Nations to be
transmitted to the Security Council and the General Assembly.
Nothing in the provisions of this Treaty shall prejudice the rights of
the Contracting Parties. in conformity with this Treaty. to use nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes. in particular for their economic develop-
ment and social progress.
Explosions for peaceful purposes
ARTICLE 18
1. The Contracting Parties may carry out explosions of nuelear de·
vices for peaceful purposes-including explosions which involve devices
similar to those used in nuclear weapons-or collaborate with third
parties for the same purpose. provided that they do so in accordance with
the provisions of this article and the other articles of the Treaty, par-
ticularly articles 1 and S.
2. Contracting Parties intending to carry out. or co-operate in the
carrying out of such, an explosion shall notify the Agency and the
International Atomic Energy Agency, as far in advance as the circum-
. stances require, of the date of the explosion and shall at the same time
provide the following information:
(a) The nature of the nuclear device and the source from which
it was obtained;
(Ii) The place and purpose of the planned explosion;
(c) The procedures which will be followed in order to comply
with paragraph 3 of this article;
(d) The expected force of the device;
(e) The fullest possible information on any possible radioactive
fall·out that may result from the explosion or explosions, and the measures
which will be taken to avoid danger to the population, flora and fauna,
and territories of any other Party or Parties.
3. The General Secretary and the technical personnel designated
by the Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency may ob·
serve all the preparations, including the explosion of the device, and
shall have unrestricted access to any area in the vicinity of the site of
the explosion in order to ascertain whether the device and the pro-
cedures followed during the explosion are in conformity with the in·
Relations with other international organizations
None of the provisions of this Treaty shall be construed as impairing
the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United
Nations or, in the case of States membeI'S of the Organization of Ameri·
can States, under existing regional treaties.
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formation supplied under paragraph 2 of the present article and the
other provisions of this Treaty.
4·. The Contracting Parlies may accept the collaboration of third
parlk'S for the purpose scI forth in paragraph 1 of the present arlicle, "
in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 thereof.
AppendiX II




1. The Agency may conclude such agreements with the International
Atomic Energy Agency as are authorized by the General Conference
and as it consideI'S likely to facilitate the efficient operation of the con-
trol system established by this Treaty.
"2. The Agency may also enter into relations with any international
organization or body, especially any which may be established in the
future to supervise disarmament or measures for the control of arma-
ments in any part of the world.
3. The Contracting Parties may, if they see fit, request the advice
of the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission on all technical
matteI'S connected with the application of the Treaty with which the Com-
mission is competent to deal under its Statute.
Measures in the event of violation of the Treaty
ARTICLE 20
1. The General Conference shall take note of all cases in which, in
its opinion, any Contracting Party is not complying fully with its obli.
gations under this Treaty and shall draw the matter to the attention of
the Party concerned, making such recommendations as it deems
appropriate.
2. If, in its opinion, Buch non.compliance constitutes a violation
of this Treaty which might endanger peace and security, the General
Conference shan report thereon simultaneously to the Security Council
and the General"Assembly through the Secretary.General of the United
Nations and to the Council of the Organization of American States.
The General Conference shall likewise report to the International




1. The Agency shall enjoy in the territory of each of the Contract-
ing Parties such legal capacity and such privileges and immunities as
may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment
of its purposes.
2. Representatives of the Contracting Parties accredited to the
Agency and officials of the Agency shall similarly enjoy such privileges
and immunities as are necessary for the performance of their functions.
3. The Agency may conclude agreements with the Contracting Par-
ties with a view to determining the details of the application of para-
graphs I and 2 of this article.
Notification of other agreements
ARTICLE 23
Once this Treaty has entered into force, the Secretariat shall be
notified immediately of any international agreement concluded by any
of the Contracting Parties on matteI'S with which this Treaty is con·




Unless the Parties concerned agree on another mode of peaceful
settlement," any question or dispute concerning the interpretation or
..' "application of this Treaty which is not settled shall be referred to the
;;-:-'; International Court of Justice with the prior consent of the parties to
the controversy.
";.
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(a) Deposit of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty with
the Depositary Government by the Governments of the States men.
tioned in article 25 which are in existence on the date when this Treaty
is opened for signature and which are not affected by the provisions
of article 25, paragraph 2;
(6) Signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I annexed
to this Treaty by all extra-continental and continental States having de
jure or de facto international responsibility for territories situated in
the zone of application of the Treaty;
(e) Signature and ratification of the Additional Protocol II an.
nexed to this Treaty by all powers possessing nuclear weapons;
(d) Conclusion of bilateral agreements on the application of the
Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency in ac.
cordance with article 13 of this Treaty.
2. All signatory States shall have the imprescriptible right to waive,
wholly or in part, the requirements laid down in the preceding para-
graph. They may do 80 by means of a declaration which shall be an. .
nexed to their respective instruments of ratification and which may be
formulated at the time of deposit of the instrument or subsequently.
For those States which exercise this right, this Treaty shall enter into
force upon deposit of the declaration, or as soon as those requirements
have been met which have not been expreSSly waived.
3. As SOOn as this Treaty has entered into force in accordance
with the provisions of paragraph 2 for eleven States, the Depositary
Government shall convene a preliminary meeting of those States in
order that the Agency may be set up and commence its work.
4. Mter the entry into force of the Treaty for all the countries of
the zone, the rise of a new power possessing nuclear weapons shall
have the effect of suspending the execution of this Treaty for those
countries which have ratified it without waiving the requirements of
paragraph I, sub·paragraph (e) of this article, and which request such
suspension; the Treaty shall remain suspended until the new power, on
its own initiative or upon request by the General Conference, ratifies
the annexed Additional Protocol II.
ARTICLE 29",...
' .~ -, ", .': 1- "~"';!
• ... ~ ,". I
ARTICLE 27
This Treaty shall not be subject to reservations.
ARTICLE 25
1. This Treaty shall be open indefinitely for signature by:
(a) All the Latin American Republics;
(b) All other sovereign States situated in their entirety ~of
latitude 35° north in the western hemisphere; and, except as proVIded
in paragraph 2 of this article, all such States which become sovereign,
when they have been admitted by the General Conference.
2. The General Conference shall not take any decision regarding
the admission of a political entity part or all of whose territory is the
subject, prior to the date when this Treaty is opened for signature, of a
dispute or claim between an extra-continental country and one or more
Latin American States, 80 long as the dispute has not been settled by
peaceful means.
ARTICLE 26
1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States
in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures.
2. This Treaty and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited
with the Government of the United States of Mexico, which is hereby
designated the Depositary Government.
3. The Depositary Government shall send certified copies of this
Treaty to the Governments of signatory States and shall notify them of





1. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article,
this Treaty shall enter into force among. the States that have ratified







The undersigned Plenipotentiaries, furnished with full powers by
their respective Governments,
Convinced that the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
in Latin America, negotiated and signed in accordance with the recom.
mendations of the General Assembly of the United Nations in resolu-
tion 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, represents an important step
towards ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,
Aware that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not an end .
in itself but rather a means of achieving general and complete disarma.
ment at a later stage,
Desiring to contribute, so far as lies in their power, towards ending
the armaments race, especially in the field of nuclear weapons, and
towards strengthening a world at peace, based on mutual respect and
sovereign equality of States,
Denunciation of the declaration referred to in article 28, paragraph
2, shall be subject to the same procedures as the denunciation of the
Treaty, except that it shall takc effect on the dale of delivery of the
respective notification.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, having de-
posited their full powers, found in good and due form, sign this Treaty
on behalf of their respective Governments.
DONE at Mexico City, Distrito Federal, on the fourteenth day of
February, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-seven.





Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1
To undertake to apply the status of denuclearization in respect of
warlike purposes as defined in articles I, 3, 5 and 13 of the Treaty
", for' the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America in territories '.
·,,1; for which; de jure or de facto, they are internationally responsible and -.














1. This Treaty shall be of a permanent nature and shall remain
in force indefinitely, but any Party may denounce it by notifying the
General Secretary of the Agency if, in the opinion of the denouncing
State, there have arisen or may arise circumstances connected with the
content of the Treaty or of the annexed Additional Protocols I and II
which affect its supreme interests and the peace and security of one or
more Contracting Parties.
2. The denunciation shall take effect three months after the delivery
to the General Secretary of the Agency of the notification by the Gov-
ernment of the signatory State concerned. The General Secretary shall
immediately communicate such notification to the other Contracting
Parties and to the Secretary·General of the United Nations for the in-
formation of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the
United Nations. He shall also communicate it to the Secretary General
of the Organization of American States.
This Treaty, of which the Spanish, Chinese, English, French, Portu-
guese and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall be registered by
the Depositary Government in accordance with Article 102 of the United
Nations Charter. The Depositary Government shall notify the Secretary-
General of the United Nations of the signatures, ratifications and amend-
ments relating to this Treaty and shall communicate them to the
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Secretary, who shall transmit them to all the other Contracting Parlies
and, in addition, to signatories in accordance with article 6. The Coun-
cil, through the General Secretary, shall, immediately following the
meeting of signatories, convene a special session of the General Con·
ference to examine the proposals made, for the adoption of which a
two·thirds majority of the Contracting Parties present and voting shall
be required.
2. Amendments adopted shall enter inta...force as soon as the re-
quirements set forth in article 28 of this Treltty-have been complied
with.
ARTICLE 31
Authentic texts and registration
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Additional Protocol II
This Protocol shall enter into force, for the States which have rati-
fied it, on the date of the deposit of their respective instruments of
ratification.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, having de-
posited their full powers, found in good and due fonn, sign this Treaty
on behalf of their respective Governments.
ARTICLE 2
The duration of this Protocol shall be the same as that of the Treaty
for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America of which this
Protocol is an annex, and the provisions regarding ratification and
denunciation contained in the Treaty shall be applicable to it.
ARTICLE 3
The undersigned Plenipotentiaries, furnished with full powers by their
respective Governments,
Convinced that the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
in Latin America, negotiated and signed in accordance with the recom-
mendations of the General Assembly of the United Nations in resolution
1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, is an important step towards
ensuring the non.proliferation of nuclear weapons,
Aware that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not an end
in itself but rather a means for achieving general and complete dis-
armament at a later stage,
Desiring to contribute, so far as lies in their power, towards ending
the annaments race, especially in the field of nuclear weapons, and
towards promoting and strengthening a world at peace based on mutual
respect and sovereign equality of States,
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The Governments represented by the undersigned Plenipotentiaries
undertake, therefore, not to contribute in any way to the performance
of acts involving a violation of the obligations of article 1 of the Treaty
in the territories to which the Treaty applies in accordance with article
4 thereof.
ARTICLE 3
The Governments represented by the undersigned Plenipotentiaries
also undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against
the Contracting Parties of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America.
ARTICLE 4
The duration of this Protocol shall be the same as that of the Treaty
for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America of which this
Protocol is an annex, and the definitions of territory and nuclear weap.
ons set forth in articles 3 and 5 of the Treaty shall be applicable to
the Protocol, as well as the provisions regarding ratification, reserva-
tions, denunciation, authentic text~ and registration contained in arti.
cles 26, 27, 30 and 31 of the Treaty.
ARTICLE 5
ment is an annex, shall be fully respected by the Parties to this Proto.
col in all its express aims and provisions.
ARTICLE 2
This Protocol shall enter into force, for the States which have rati-
fied it, on the date of the deposit of their respective instruments of
ratification.
IN WrrNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, having de.
posited their full powers, found in good and due fonn, sign this Treaty
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Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE-'l
The status of denuclearlzation of Latin America in respect of warlike
purposes, as defined, delimited and set forth in the Treaty for the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America of which this instru·
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i;ti,; r~;,:;~:'j~'(';l ~;lnJ.l entc:r ir:to force foc ea::.:h St2~c on the d~tt: of Jl:.::'
C':':'f(12.it.. \l.ith UiC: 62Ix.J~it2.ry cf itc..; ic:c::tn:rr.ent of etifica.Uon.
thousand nine hLndred bnaOneeLl' of
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